Position: PhD Candidate
Current Institution: University of Michigan
Abstract: Analysis and Design of Information Transmission in Networks of Strategic Agents
Most of today’s systems consist of strategic agents with some private information and uncertainty towards others’ information and system states. Transmission and exchange of information in such networks has been the focus of many research areas such as mechanism design information design and Bayesian learning. The information is directly exchanged in mechanism design and information design and the goal is to steer agents’ actions towards a desirable direction by means of putting incentives in place (mechanism design) or designing the appropriate information structure (information design). Information can also spread in a more indirect way by agents who observe each others actions (Bayesian learning). In my research I follow two main directions of Analysis” and “Design” to investigate the spread of information in networks of strategic agents. Specifically I analyze dynamic systems with asymmetric information and characterize their equilibria and study the spread of information induced by these equilibrium behaviors. Further I study how incentives or information structures can be designed to shape the equilibrium behavior of agents. Specifically in one of my works I study a joint information and mechanism design problem where agents with private types arrive at a queue with unobservable backlog. I investigate how an information designer that observes the queue backlog can design taxes and type dependent suggestions for the agents to gain the most revenue. In this setting the information designer is a sender of the information in the information design aspect and a receiver in the mechanism design aspect of the model.
Nasimeh Heydaribeni received her B.S. and M.S. degrees in Electrical Engineering at Sharif University of Technology Tehran Iran in 2015 and 2017 respectively. She is currently pursuing her Ph.D. degree in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at University of Michigan Ann Arbor. Her research interests are game theory and its applications in networked systems with emphasis on mechanism design dynamic games with asymmetric information and information design.